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An Eye-Tracking Investigation of Written Sarcasm Comprehension:
The Roles of Familiarity and Context
Alexandra ‚Turcan and Ruth Filik
University of Nottingham
This article addresses a current theoretical debate between the standard pragmatic model, the graded
salience hypothesis, and the implicit display theory, by investigating the roles of the context and of the
properties of the sarcastic utterance itself in the comprehension of a sarcastic remark. Two eye-tracking
experiments were conducted where we manipulated the speaker’s expectation in the context and the
familiarity of the sarcastic remark. The results of the first eye-tracking study showed that literal
comments were read faster than unfamiliar sarcastic comments, regardless of whether an explicit
expectation was present in the context. The results of the second eye-tracking study indicated an early
processing difficulty for unfamiliar sarcastic comments, but not for familiar sarcastic comments. Later
reading time measures indicated a general difficulty for sarcastic comments. Overall, results seem to
suggest that the familiarity of the utterance does indeed affect the time course of sarcasm processing
(supporting the graded salience hypothesis), although there is no evidence that making the speaker’s
expectation explicit in the context affects it as well (thus failing to support the implicit display theory).
Keywords: sarcasm, irony, language comprehension, figurative language, eye-tracking
Verbal irony and sarcasm are forms of nonliteral language that
are commonly used in our everyday interactions. Gibbs (2000) and
Hancock (2004) both reported similar rates of ironic language
use—about 8% of conversational turns include an ironic comment,
be it between friends, or total strangers. However, psycholinguists
have found it difficult to define these two forms of figurative
language and conceptualise the mechanisms through which people
manage to understand and make use of them in their everyday life
(Bryant, 2012).
Operational Definitions
Irony is defined as a form of indirect language, used when the
speaker expresses one evaluative utterance but implies a different
evaluative appraisal (Burgers, van Mulken, & Schellens, 2011).
An example of an ironic comment is No. 1 below, where the
expressed evaluation is that the weather is “great” but the implied
evaluation is that the weather is “terrible.” Sarcasm is a specific
form of irony, which is used when the target object of the comment
is a person (Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989). An example of a sarcastic
comment is No. 2 below, where the expressed evaluation is that the
colleague is “early” but the implied evaluation is that they are
“late.”
1. Nonsarcastic irony—Uttering while standing outside in
the pouring rain: “The weather is great today!”
2. Sarcastic irony—Uttering to a colleague who arrived at a
meeting half an hour late: “You’re early!”
This article is concerned with the comprehension of sarcastic
irony (one of the most commonly used forms of irony), where the
expressed (positive) evaluation is the direct opposite of the in-
tended (negative) evaluation, as in example No. 2 above.
Current Theoretical Debates
Existing theories of sarcasm processing can be classified into
modular accounts and interactive accounts, and they differ in terms
of their predictions for the time course of sarcasm processing, and
the roles played by the properties of the utterance itself and by
contextual factors. In what follows, we give a brief overview of the
two theoretical categories, and the reported experiments focus on
testing the predictions of specific theories from each category.
Modular accounts claim that the literal meaning of a sarcastic
utterance is usually accessed first and the sarcastic meaning is
accessed afterward. One example of a well-known modular ac-
count is the standard pragmatic model (Grice, 1975), which pre-
dicts that sarcastic utterances will always take longer to process
than the same utterances used literally, because they will always
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require the extra step of processing and then rejecting the literal
meaning of the sarcastic utterance, irrespective of how supportive
the context is (Gibbs, 1999). A more recent modular account is the
graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003), which introduces
the concept of salience. A salient meaning is one that is stored in
the mental lexicon due to its familiarity, conventionality, fre-
quency, or prototypicality (Peleg, Giora, & Fein, 2001). According
to the graded salience hypothesis, salient meanings are processed
first, regardless of strength of context (Giora, 1997).
A familiar sarcastic remark (like, “That’s great!”) is assumed to
have two salient meanings: the sarcastic and the nonsarcastic, and
they will both be activated in parallel. Therefore, the graded
salience hypothesis predicts that familiar sarcastic remarks should
not have longer processing times than their literal counterparts. An
unfamiliar sarcastic remark however, has only one salient mean-
ing, which is usually the literal one. In the case of unfamiliar
sarcastic remarks, the graded salience hypothesis predicts a very
similar comprehension process to the standard pragmatic model—
unfamiliar sarcastic comments will take longer to process com-
pared with literal counterparts, because the salient literal meaning
will be activated first, followed by the nonsalient sarcastic mean-
ing (Giora, 1997, 2003). Diverging from the standard pragmatic
model, however, the salience-based interpretation will not be dis-
carded, because it contributes to the interpretation process.
Interactive accounts claim that the sarcastic meaning is accessed
directly in supportive contexts. A classic example is the direct
access view (Gibbs, 1986), which predicts that sarcastic utterances
should be processed in equal time to their literal counterparts when
embedded in supportive contexts (that is, contexts where there is a
discrepancy between expectation and reality), because readers do
not have to perform a complete analysis of the literal meaning first
(Gibbs & Colston, 2012). A more recent interactive account is the
parallel constraint satisfaction model (Pexman, 2008). This is a
more general model, that allows for many different and unspeci-
fied contextual factors to act as cues for sarcasm and therefore
facilitate sarcasm processing. In this respect, the parallel constraint
satisfaction model could be considered to be a framework theory,
in that it does not have a specific set of factors for which it makes
testable predictions.
A testable interactive theory of sarcasm processing specifically
(and not figurative language in general), is the implicit display
theory (Utsumi, 2000) which expands on the direct access view’s
claim that context can aid sarcasm comprehension, but dissociates
itself from the idea that only one factor can influence sarcasm
comprehension. The implicit display theory postulates that sar-
casm requires an ironic environment, which is a property of the
context. An ironic environment includes three components: (a) the
speaker has to have an expectation (known to both interlocutors),
(b) the expectation has to be unmet by the current situation, and (c)
the speaker has to have a negative emotional attitude toward the
incongruity between expectation and reality (Utsumi, 2000). Ac-
cording to the implicit display theory, sarcastic remarks implicitly
display this ironic environment, and they can do so to different
degrees.
The implicit display is a property of the ironic utterance; to
achieve implicit display, this utterance should (a) allude to the
speaker’s expectation, (b) violate at least one of Grice’s pragmatic
principles, and (c) indirectly express the speaker’s negative atti-
tude (Utsumi, 2000). According to the implicit display theory,
sarcasm comprehension is governed by the concept of prototypi-
cality. A prototypical sarcastic utterance is one that satisfies all
three conditions for implicit display. The claim is that prototypical
sarcastic utterances that fully satisfy the three requirements of
implicit display will have the highest degree of ironicalness (that
is, they will be perceived as most ironic). Sarcasm that fails to
satisfy one or more of the requirements will have a lower score of
ironicalness (that is, they will be perceived as less ironic).
Utsumi (2000) gives a mathematical formula (see Equation 1
below) for degree of ironicalness that contains degree of manifest-
ness as a variable (defined as the explicitness of the speaker’s
expectation in the context).
d(U) dm * da (1 dm) * dd di de (1)
This is Equation 1: The mathematical formula for degree of
ironicalness according to the Implicit Display Theory (Utsumi,
2000). The abbreviations are as follows: d(U)  degree of irony;
dm degree of manifestness; da degree of allusion; dd degree
of polarity; di  degree of pragmatic insincerity; de  degree of
indirect expression of negative attitude.
In the series of experiments presented in this article, dm (the
degree of manifestness) was the only factor from the formula that
was manipulated. All other factors have been kept constant and at
their maximal values (da: all sarcastic comments said the opposite
of what the speaker meant, dd: polarity of the comments was
always positive, that is, only sarcastic criticisms were employed,
di: the maxim of quality was the only maxim violated, and de: the
same sarcastic cues were used across comments, that is, an excla-
mation mark at the end), so that the ironic environment and
implicit display were prototypical and could only vary with degree
of manifestness.
One prediction of the implicit display theory is that more pro-
totypical sarcastic utterances, that is, those that are made in con-
texts in which the speaker’s expectation is made explicit, will be
processed faster than or as fast as their literal counterparts (see
Utsumi, 2000). Less prototypical sarcastic remarks, that is, those
that are uttered in contexts in which the speaker’s expectation is
implicit (and hence harder to infer) will be processed more slowly
than literal equivalents.
Empirical Evidence
The first question that researchers have typically addressed is,
Do sarcastic utterances take longer to process than literal ones? In
a typical experiment, participants would be presented with scenar-
ios that would end in an utterance that could be interpreted as
either literal or sarcastic. On the one hand, evidence from self-
paced reading studies (e.g., Giora, 1995; Giora, Fein, & Schwartz,
1998; Spotorno & Noveck, 2014), and eye-tracking studies (e.g.,
Filik & Moxey, 2010; Kaakinen, Olkoniemi, Kinnari, & Hyönä,
2014) showing that sarcasm comprehension takes longer than
literal language comprehension, has been taken to support modular
accounts. Other evidence showing that sarcasm can be compre-
hended as fast as literal language, again from self-paced reading
(e.g., Gibbs, 1986), and additionally from visual-world paradigm
studies (e.g., Kowatch, Whalen, & Pexman, 2013), has been taken
as support for more interactive accounts.
To refine the debate, researchers started to address the question
of whether properties of the utterance (e.g., its salience) affect the
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time course of sarcasm comprehension. Although “salience” is a
concept loosely defined within the graded salience hypothesis,
researchers have generally equated it with “familiarity,” that is, if
a sarcastic utterance is deemed “salient,” that means that that
utterance is familiar to readers in its sarcastic interpretation. Over-
all, research seems to support the graded salience hypothesis
prediction that familiar sarcastic utterances are processed in equal
time to literal ones, but unfamiliar sarcastic utterances take longer
to process than their literal counterparts (e.g., lexical decision task,
Giora & Fein, 1999, eye-tracking, Filik, Leuthold, Wallington, &
Page, 2014, Experiment 1).
In the literature presented above, contextual factors have not
been manipulated at all, other than ensuring that sarcastic utter-
ances were embedded in contexts where there was a mismatch
between expectation and reality, whereas literal utterances were
embedded in contexts where there was no such mismatch. How-
ever, it seems intuitive to assume that contextual factors must play
a role in sarcasm comprehension along with properties of the
utterance itself, because an utterance can only be interpreted as
sarcastic in context (Calmus & Caillies, 2014; however, see Giora
et al., 2013, for a different view). Thus, researchers wanted to
address a third question of, specifically, whether contextual factors
affect the time course of sarcasm comprehension. Evidence for the
role of context is also mixed. There are studies that showed that the
degree of negativity of the event described in the context does
indeed affect the time course of sarcasm comprehension (e.g.,
reading task, Ivanko & Pexman, 2003), and that this negativity can
also interact with the explicitness of the expectation in the context
to influence how sarcastic a comment is perceived to be (e.g.,
Utsumi, 2005). Furthermore, the time course of sarcasm compre-
hension can also be affected by factors like the occupation of the
speaker in the context (Pexman, Ferretti, & Katz, 2000), context
incongruity, and relationship between characters (Pexman,
Whalen, & Green, 2010). These studies support interactive ac-
counts of sarcasm comprehension by showing that context can
indeed affect the time course of sarcasm processing (see also
Campbell & Katz, 2012).
On the other hand, there are studies showing that the time course
of sarcasm comprehension is not affected by having an expectation
made explicit in the context (e.g., Giora, Fein, Kaufman, Eisen-
berg, & Erez, 2009), or by having a character that is known to be
sarcastic in the context (e.g., Giora et al., 2007). These studies
support the modular accounts.
In conclusion, evidence in the literature with regards to the time
course of sarcasm processing is mixed and conflicting (as also
shown by Gibbs & Colston, 2012). Possible reasons for this are
that some of the studies described above either lacked a good
control over confounding factors (e.g., saliency), they did not have
the design required in order to distinguish between the two groups
of theories, or the methodology they employed was not sensitive
enough to reveal reading time differences between sarcastic and
literal comments, or effects of the context.
This article focuses on testing the predictions of three theories:
two modular (the standard pragmatic model and the graded sa-
lience hypothesis), and one interactive (the implicit display theory,
because it makes testable predictions about the way in which
specific contextual factors should affect sarcasm comprehension).
Therefore, from here onward, the focus of the article shifts to these
three specific theories.
The present studies set out to contribute to the debate outlined
above, specifically, investigating the roles of familiarity of the
comment itself and explicitness of expectation in the context using
tightly controlled literal and sarcastic stimuli and a sensitive meth-
odology. The eye-tracking method has been previously used to
investigate the effect of familiarity (e.g., Filik et al., 2014), but not
of contextual factors. This method is a more sensitive and precise
measure of comprehension than simple self-paced reading times,
and it also allows us to investigate both early and late effects of our
manipulations on sarcasm processing. The target comments in our
experiments will be disambiguated by a single word, which will
also allow us to distinguish early and late stages of processing
which might have been confounded in studies that had disambig-
uating regions made up of several words.
Experiment 1
The aim of the first experiment was to investigate the role of the
speaker’s expectation on sarcasm processing. Therefore, the ex-
plicitness of the speaker’s expectation in the context and the
literality of the target utterance were manipulated, while all target
utterances were unfamiliar (because the predictions made by the
two modular accounts and those made by the implicit display
theory are most clearly distinct in cases where the sarcastic utter-
ances are unfamiliar). Specifically, both the standard pragmatic
model and the graded salience hypothesis would predict a process-
ing difficulty for unfamiliar sarcastic utterances in both explicit
and implicit contexts. In other words, in order to support the two
modular theories, we would expect to find a main effect of liter-
ality, but no interaction between literality and explicitness. In
contrast, the implicit display theory would predict that when the
speaker’s expectation is made explicit in the context, sarcastic
utterances would be read as fast as literal ones, however, when the
expectation is implicit, sarcastic utterances would take longer to
read than literal ones. In other words, in order to support the
implicit display theory, we would expect to find an interaction
between literality and explicitness, with longer reading times for
sarcastic than literal comments only in the implicit condition.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two students from the University of Not-
tingham (Mage  18 years and 4 months, SD  6 months, 31
females and 1 male) participated in the experiment. All partici-
pants were native English speakers, not diagnosed with any read-
ing disorders, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They
received course credit in return for their participation.
Materials and design. Twenty-four experimental materials
were constructed (see Table 1 for an example and Appendix A for
a selection; the full set of items is available from the first author).
Each scenario was made up of five sentences, describing an
interaction between two characters, and ending with a comment
that one character made toward the other one. The first sentence of
the context simply introduced the two characters and the situation
they were in (e.g., Dean and Chloe were on holiday in Valencia for
a week.).
The second sentence had two versions, which differed between
the explicit and implicit conditions. In the explicit condition, the
second sentence contained an explicit expectation of the speaker
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regarding how the other character should behave, which was
known to both characters, as required by the implicit display
theory (e.g., The end of the trip was approaching so Dean asked
Chloe to think of something thrilling to do on their last day.). In the
implicit condition, the second sentence of the context did not
contain any mention of an expectation (e.g., Their trip was quickly
coming to an end, and they weren’t sure what to do on their final
day.). Results from a stimulus norming test revealed that as in-
tended, participants thought that the materials in the explicit con-
dition created an expectation for how the other character should
behave significantly more than the materials in the implicit con-
dition (see Appendix B).
The third sentence contained the outcome of the second char-
acter’s behavior and it had two versions, which differed between
the literal and sarcastic conditions. In the literal conditions, the
outcome fulfilled the expectation mentioned in the previous sen-
tence (e.g., Chloe suggested they go and watch the Formula 1
race, which was Dean’s favorite sport.). In the sarcastic condi-
tions, the outcome frustrated the expectation mentioned in the
previous sentence (e.g., Chloe suggested they stay in the hotel and
watch TV, which was quite boring.). Results from a stimulus
norming test verified that indeed the materials in the sarcastic
condition were perceived as significantly more sarcastic than those
in the literal condition (see Appendix B).
The final comment was contained in the fourth sentence (e.g.,
“Your suggestion is stirring!” Dean said to her.). In the literal
conditions, the speaker meant what they literally said through the
final comment, which had a positive meaning, whereas in the
sarcastic conditions, the speaker said the opposite of what they
meant, that is, they said something positive in order to convey a
negative meaning. All final sarcastic comments were nonconven-
tional, meaning they were not familiar to the readers (as shown by
a familiarity stimulus norming test; see Appendix B). The fifth
sentence was a wrap-up sentence that concluded the scenario (e.g.,
They went out.). Thus the experiment consisted of a 2 literality
(literal vs. sarcastic)  2 speaker’s expectation (explicit vs. im-
plicit) design, with both factors being within-subject and within-
item.
Besides the literality, explicitness, and familiarity stimulus
norming tests, two more norming tests were conducted. One ver-
ified that the materials were suitable for testing the implicit display
theory, that is, they fulfilled the offline predictions of the theory:
the reader’s expectation for sarcasm was increased in the explicit
condition compared with the implicit condition (see Appendix B).
The other test investigated whether the conditions differed in terms
of how natural they sound to the reader, and the results indicated
the literal materials sounded more natural than the sarcastic ones
(see Appendix B). This is perhaps to be expected, given that
sarcastic comments are employed significantly less in every day
speech than literal ones.
Thirty-six filler materials accompanied the 24 experimental
materials. A third of the filler items also contained two characters
but ended in a literal negative utterance, another third did not have
any characters and were informative texts, whereas the final third
contained two characters and ended in a literal positive utterance
(see a selection of filler items in Appendix C).
The software used to display the texts (Eye Track; http://blogs
.umass.edu/eyelab/software/) ensured the randomization and coun-
terbalancing of the scenarios. For each scenario, there were four
stimulus presentation files, each containing only one version of
each scenario, and a total of six experimental items for each
condition. Each participant was presented with one stimulus file,
so that in the end data were collected from eight participants for
each stimulus file. The order in which the scenarios were presented
within each stimulus file was randomized for each participant.
Procedure. Eye movements were recorded via an SR Re-
search Eyelink 1000 eye tracker that sampled eye position every
millisecond. Viewing was binocular, but only one eye was re-
corded for each participant. Materials were displayed on a com-
puter screen approximately 56 cm from participants’ eyes. Before
the start of the experiment, the procedure was explained to the
participants. They were instructed to read as they would normally,
taking as much time as they needed in order to understand the
texts. Participants were then seated at the eye tracker and placed
on a chin- and forehead-rest to minimize head movements.
They then completed a calibration procedure. Before each trial,
a fixation box appeared in the top left quadrant of the screen.
Once the participant fixated this box, the texts would be pre-
sented. If the participants’ apparent point of fixation did not
match with the fixation box, the experimenter recalibrated the
eye tracker. Each trial consisted of one scenario, presented as
Table 1
Example Scenario (Experiment 1)
Literality Explicitness Example scenario
Literal Explicit Dean and Chloe were on holiday in Valencia for a week. The end of the trip was approaching so Dean asked Chloe to think
of something thrilling to do on their last day. Chloe suggested they go and watch the Formula 1 race, which was Dean’s
favourite sport. “Your/ suggestion is precritical region/ stirring!” critical region/ Dean said to her. Postcritical region/
They went out.
Implicit Dean and Chloe were on holiday in Valencia for a week. Their trip was quickly coming to an end, and they weren’t sure
what to do on their final day. Chloe suggested they go and watch the Formula 1 race, which was Dean’s favourite sport.
“Your/ suggestion is precritical region/ stirring!” critical region/ Dean said to her. Postcritical region/ They went out.
Sarcastic Explicit Dean and Chloe were on holiday in Valencia for a week. The end of the trip was approaching so Dean asked Chloe to think
of something thrilling to do on their last day. Chloe suggested they stay in the hotel and watch TV, which was quite
boring. “Your/ suggestion is precritical region/ stirring!” critical region/ Dean said to her. Postcritical region/ They went
out.
Implicit Dean and Chloe were on holiday in Valencia for a week. Their trip was quickly coming to an end, and they weren’t sure
what to do on their final day. Chloe suggested they stay in the hotel and watch TV, which was quite boring. “Your/
suggestion is precritical region/ stirring!” critical region/ Dean said to her. Postcritical region/ They went out.
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four lines of text, with two blank lines between each line of text.
Once the participants finished reading it, they looked away
from the text and toward a post-it note affixed to the bottom
right hand edge of the monitor, and then pressed the right-
shoulder button on the console to progress to the next trial.
After 25% of the trials, a yes/no comprehension question ap-
peared to ensure that the participant actually read and compre-
hended the text. The comprehension question (e.g., “Were Dean
and Chloe on holiday in Valencia?”) related solely to the context
of the scenario, and it was not a test of sarcasm comprehension.
The average correct response rate of 94.7% indicates that partici-
pants were indeed reading for comprehension.
Results and Discussion
Each scenario had three analysis regions. The critical region was
the word that disambiguated the target utterance as being either
sarcastic or literal. For example, in the scenario in Table 1, the
critical word in the final comment “Your suggestion is stirring!”
was “stirring!” The precritical region consisted of the two words
preceding the critical region (e.g., “suggestion is”). The postcriti-
cal region was the remainder of the target utterance (e.g., Dean
said to her.) Three measures of reading behavior are reported:
first-pass reading time (the sum of all fixations in a region from
first entering it until leaving it either via its left or right boundary,
also known as gaze duration when the region comprises a single
word), regression path (or go-past) reading time (the sum of all
fixations from the time that a region is first entered until the region
is left via its right region boundary), and total reading time (the
sum of all fixations in a region, including fixations made when
rereading the region).
Prior to the statistical analysis, the data were preprocessed using
the EyeDoctor software (http://www.psych.umass.edu/eyelab). For
each participant, the blinks were removed, and also the fixations
were aligned on the vertical plane. The EyeDry software was then
used to create the files needed for data analysis. Trials that had
zero first-pass reading times for two consecutive regions (where
regions were defined as a whole sentence in the context, the
precritical, critical, and postcritical regions) were eliminated (dis-
carded trials accounted for 2.6% of the data).
Data analysis was performed in R (R Core Team, 2013) using
linear mixed effects modeling (lme4 package) and potential inter-
actions were decomposed in R using the function testInteractions
from the phia package (where the chi-square is the default test; all
reported p values are Bonferroni corrected). The first step was to
discard 0-ms reading times from the analysis (see Table 2 for the
percentage of data removed due to the reading time being 0
ms—typically due to participants skipping over the respective
region). This was in addition to the 2.6% of the trials already
removed due to having zero first-pass reading times for two
consecutive regions.
The second step was to establish the appropriate random
effects structure for each analysis. We started by fitting the
maximal model to the data, as recommended by Barr, Levy,
Scheepers, and Tily (2013). The random effects structure of the
maximal model was: (1  literality  explicitness | subject) 
(1  literality  explicitness | item). The reason why literality
and explicitness were introduced as random slopes for both
subjects and items is because both factors were within-subject,
and within-item, respectively. However, because the maximal
model failed to converge, the random effects structure had to be
simplified in order to obtain convergence. This was done by
progressively removing one random component at a time—the
one that explained the least amount of variance in the previous
nonconverging model.
The best way of establishing the appropriate random effects
structure is currently a debatable issue. Barr et al. (2013)
recommend always fitting the maximal model, with random
slopes for all fixed effects of interest. However, this suggestion
is often not practical—fitting the maximal model might often
fail to converge because the model is overparameterized—the
researcher is overfitting the data. The reason why Barr et al.
(2013) argue for fitting the maximal model is because they
claim that excluding a random slope for one of the fixed effects
of interest increases the likelihood of making a Type I error.
However, Matuschek and his colleagues have recently coun-
tered this point. They conducted a simulation study and con-
cluded that the maximal model is not in fact the best choice,
because although it reduces the likelihood of making a Type I
error, it also significantly reduces power (Matuschek, Kliegl,
Vasishth, Baayen, & Bates, 2015). Their study indicated that for
factorial studies such as those reported in this article, it is
recommended that the random effects structure of nonconverg-
ing models be reduced until a significant decrease in goodness
of fit is observed. The model that is supported by the data (the
one prior to a significant decrease in goodness of fit) provides
the best balance between Type I error rates and power.
The analyses reported in this article reduce the random ef-
fects structure in a similar way to the procedure suggested in
Matuschek et al. (2015), except that the simplification proce-
dure is only continued until convergence is achieved rather than
until a significant decrease in goodness of fit is observed (i.e.,
it is stopped earlier). That is because continuing until a signif-
icant decrease in goodness of fit is obtained leads to an even
simpler random effects structure than the structure obtained by
stopping the simplification process when a model converges. It
is important to note that for the key findings reported in this
article, both procedures lead to the same fixed-effects structures
in the final models.
Once the random effects structure had been established, the third
step was to perform a series of likelihood ratio tests comparing the
fit of models with different fixed-effects structures in order to
Table 2
Summary of 0-ms Reading Time Removal (Experiment 1)










Note. fp  first-pass; rp  regression path; tt  total reading time.
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reach the best model fit for our data.1 The procedure used was to
compare the model with the two factors in interaction with pro-
gressively simpler fixed-effects structures (that is, two main effects
but no interaction, or only one main effect). See Table 3 for the
models that had the best fit for our data and the values of their
fixed-effects parameters. Furthermore, see Appendix D for the t
values associated with the fixed factors that did not have signifi-
cant effects (i.e., were not included in the best models), and the
series of likelihood ratio tests performed in order to reach the best
models.
The precritical region. No effects were observed in first-pass
or total reading times—see Figures 1a and 1c. However, regression
path reading time was shorter following explicit contexts (Mrp-explicit 
309ms, SEM  11 ms) than implicit ones (Mrp-implicit  362 ms,
SEM  20 ms)—see Figure 1b. This suggests that even before
reading the disambiguating word, participants reread the context in
the implicit condition more than in the explicit one. Importantly,
the null effect observed in first-pass reading time was reassuring in
that it suggested that there was no baseline reading time difference
between the experimental conditions.
The critical region. There was a main effect of literality on all
reading measures. Literal utterances were read faster (Mfp-literal 
275 ms, SEM  11 ms; Mrp-literal  441 ms, SEM  22 ms;
Mtt-literal 355 ms, SEM 15 ms) than sarcastic ones (Mfp-sarcastic
299 ms, SEM  10 ms; Mrp-sarcastic  527 ms, SEM  23 ms;
Mtt-sarcastic  446 ms, SEM  15 ms)—see Figure 2a, 2b, and 2c
below.
It seems that when the disambiguating word is encountered in
the text, readers take longer to read it if it points toward a sarcastic
interpretation of the comment, than if the comment’s intended
meaning is literal. These results clearly support the predictions
made by the modular accounts of sarcasm interpretation (the
standard pragmatic model and the graded salience hypothesis), but
offer no support for the implicit display theory’s prediction that
sarcastic utterances in contexts containing an explicit expectation
will be read as fast as literal utterances. In other words, it seems
that we failed to support the prediction that increasing the degree
of manifestness of the speaker’s expectation in the context offers
an initial processing advantage for sarcastic utterances. These
results are in line with those of previous studies of irony process-
ing that report a literality effect (e.g., Filik et al., 2014 for unfa-
miliar ironies; Filik & Moxey, 2010; Giora, 1995; Giora et al.,
1998, 2007; Kaakinen et al., 2014).
The postcritical region. An interaction between literality and
explicitness was observed in first-pass reading time—see Figure
3a. Post hoc comparisons showed that (a) the region of text
following a literal comment was read faster when the context was
explicit (Mfp-literal-explicit  396 ms, SEM  15 ms) than when it
was implicit (Mfp-literal-implicit  471 ms, SEM  18 ms): 2(1,
N  32)  8, p  .009, and (b) the region following a comment
presented in an explicit context was read faster when the comment
was literal (Mfp-literal-explicit  396 ms, SEM  15 ms) than when
it was sarcastic (Mfp-sarcastic-explicit 456 ms, SEM 18 ms): 2(1,
N  32)  6.1, p  .027. Interestingly, this pattern of results was
not due to sarcastic utterances becoming more difficult in implicit
contexts, but due to literal utterances becoming more difficult in
implicit contexts. We can conclude that the contextual manipula-
tion seems to have an effect on the later stages of literal language
processing, but not on the later stages of sarcasm processing.
Regression path and total reading times only reflected a main
effect of literality—see Figure 3b and 3c. The region following a
literal utterance was read faster (Mrp-literal  522 ms, SEM  18
1 Factors like the frequency or length of the analyses regions were not
included as effects in the linear mixed models because these experiments
were designed so that we only compared between the same critical words,
precritical, and postcritical regions.
Table 3




measure Model Fixed effects Coefficient SE t
Precritical fp  1  (1  explicitness | subject)  (1  explicitness | item) (Intercept) 252.5 10 25
rp  explicitness  (1 | subject)  (1 | item) (Intercept) 307.9 21 14.6
Explicitness 54.4 22.3 2.4
tt  1  (1  literality  explicitness | subject)  (1  literality 
explicitness | item)
(Intercept) 383.4 23.4 16.4
Critical fp  1  (1  literality  explicitness | subject)  (1  literality 
explicitness | item)
(Intercept) 276.2 16.6 16.6
rp  literality  (1 | subject)  (1  explicitness | item) (Intercept) 424 45.4 9.3
Literality 92 25.7 3.6
tt  literality  (1  literality | subject)  (1  literality  explicitness | item) (Intercept) 343.5 32.2 10.7
Literality 87.9 23 3.8
Postcritical fp  literality  explicitness  (1  literality  explicitness | subject)  (1 
literality  explicitness | item)
(Intercept) 394.3 21.5 18.4
Literality 66.1 26.7 2.5




rp  literality  (1  literality  explicitness | subject)  (1  literality 
explicitness | item)
(Intercept) 530.2 35.3 15.02
Literality 80.5 30 2.7
tt  literality  (1  literality  explicitness | subject)  (1  literality 
explicitness | item)
(Intercept) 518.3 33 15.7
Literality 66.1 23.3 2.8
Note. fp  first-pass; rp  regression path; tt  total reading time.
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ms; Mtt-literal  531 ms, SEM  15 ms) than following a sarcastic
one (Mrp-sarcastic  607 ms, SEM  23 ms; Mtt-sarcastic  605 ms,
SEM  17 ms). This pattern of results was also observed in Filik
and Moxey’s (2010) study, and was taken to reflect difficulty in
integrating the comment with the context when the comment is
sarcastic. This difficulty in contextual integration seems to be
independent of the explicitness of the speaker’s expectation in the
context. Rather, as suggested by Filik and Moxey (2010), these
results provide some evidence that after a sarcastic utterance is
encountered, more reinspection of the text is required before the
reader can comprehend the material, as compared with when a
literal utterance is encountered, which is in line with the modular
accounts of sarcasm comprehension (both the standard pragmatic
model and the graded salience hypothesis), however, it fails to
support the implicit display theory.
In conclusion, the results from Experiment 1 did not provide
any support for the implicit display theory’s predictions that
explicitness of the speaker’s expectation in the context would
affect reading times for sarcastic utterances, by making them as
easy to read as literal utterances when the expectation is ex-
plicit. However, it did provide support for both modular ac-
counts’ predictions (the standard pragmatic model and the
graded salience hypothesis), by showing that unfamiliar sarcas-
tic utterances took longer to read than literal counterparts. In the
next experiment we wanted to replicate the current results and
Figure 1. Mean reading times on the precritical region (Experiment 1).
Figure 1a: first-pass reading time. Figure 1b: regression path reading
time. Figure 1c: total reading time. Error bars represent  1SEM.
Figure 2. Mean reading times on the critical region (Experiment 1).
Figure 2a: first-pass reading time. Figure 2b: regression path reading
time. Figure 2c: total reading time. Error bars represent  1SEM.
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additionally address the question of what role the properties of
the utterance play in sarcasm comprehension. To this end, in
Experiment 2 we investigated the online reading patterns of
both familiar and unfamiliar sarcastic utterances presented in
explicit and implicit contexts.
Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the results of Exper-
iment 1, and extend them by investigating the role of the properties
of the utterance in sarcasm comprehension, thus further discrimi-
nating between the predictions of the standard pragmatic model
and the graded salience hypothesis. Hence, the factor of comment
familiarity was added to the previous design. Under these circum-
stances, the two modular accounts would make different predic-
tions for the time course of sarcasm comprehension. The standard
pragmatic model would predict that sarcastic utterances would
take longer to read under all circumstances, irrespective of com-
ment familiarity or speaker’s expectation in the context. In other
words, in order to support the standard pragmatic model, we would
expect to find a main effect of literality, and no interactions with
familiarity or explicitness. The graded salience hypothesis would
predict that sarcastic utterances would take longer to read than
literal counterparts if they were unfamiliar; however, if sarcastic
utterances were familiar, they would be read as fast as literal
counterparts. In other words, in order to support the graded sa-
lience hypothesis, we would expect to find an interaction between
literality and familiarity, but no interaction with explicitness. The
implicit display theory would predict that sarcastic utterances
would take longer to read than literal ones if they are uttered in
contexts in which the speaker’s expectation is implicit; however, if
the speaker’s expectation is explicit, sarcastic utterances would be
read as fast as literal ones. Thus, as in Experiment 1, we would
expect to find an interaction between literality and explicitness, but
no interaction with familiarity.
Method
Participants. Sixty-four students from the University of Not-
tingham participated (Mage  22 years and 6 months, SD  7
months, 42 females and 22 males). None of them had taken part in
Experiment 1. All participants were native English speakers, not
diagnosed with any reading disorders, and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. They either received a £4 inconvenience allowance
for taking part, or course credit.
Materials and design. The experimental materials consisted
of 48 short texts, with the same structure as the materials of the
previous experiment (see Appendix E for a selection; the full set of
items is available from the first author). The only difference in this
experiment was that in the familiar condition the final utterance
would be for example “So excited!” instead of “Your suggestion
is stirring!” Thus the experiment consisted of a 2 literality (literal
vs. sarcastic)  2 speaker’s expectation (explicit vs. implicit)  2
familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) design, with literality and
expectation as within-subject and within-item factors, and famil-
iarity as a within-subject and between-items factor. The same set
of stimulus norming tests were conducted as in Experiment 1,
showing that (a) familiar comments were rated as significantly
more familiar to the reader than the unfamiliar ones, (b) sarcastic
comments were rated as significantly more sarcastic that the literal
ones, (c) the expectation for how the other character should behave
was significantly clearer in the explicit than in implicit conditions,
(d) literal comments sounded more natural than sarcastic ones, and
(e) the materials met the implicit display theory’s offline predic-
tion: an expectation for sarcasm was significantly higher when the
context was explicit compared with implicit (see Appendix F for
the full set of results).
There were also 48 filler items, following a similar structure as
in Experiment 1: half of the materials contained two characters but
ended in a literal negative utterance, and the other half did not have
any characters and were informative texts.
Figure 3. Mean reading times on the postcritical region (Experiment 1).
Figure 3a: first-pass reading time. Figure 3b: regression path reading
time. Figure 3c: total reading time. Error bars represent  1SEM.
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Procedure. The procedure was exactly the same as in Exper-
iment 1. In terms of the comprehension questions, the average
correct response rate was 93.9%, indicating again that participants
read and correctly comprehended the scenarios.
Results and Discussion
The scenarios in this experiment had the same three analysis
regions as in Experiment 1 (i.e., critical region: disambiguating
word, precritical region: two words prior to the disambiguating
word, and postcritical region: the remainder of the target utter-
ance). The data were preprocessed using the same software and
procedures as before. Trials that had zero first-pass reading times
for two consecutive regions were eliminated (removed trials ac-
counted for 3.5% of the data).
Data analysis was performed in the same way as in Experiment
1. The first step was to discard 0-ms reading times from the
analysis (see Table 4 for the percentage of data removed due to the
reading time being 0 ms—typically due to participants skipping
over the respective region). This was in addition to the 3.5% of the
trials already removed due to having zero first-pass reading times
for two consecutive regions. The second step was to establish the
appropriate random effects structure, which was done following
the same procedure as in Experiment 1. Once the random effects
structure had been established, the third step was to perform a
series of likelihood ratio tests comparing the fit of models with
different fixed-effects structures in order to reach the best model fit
for our data.2 The procedure used was to compare the model with
the three factors in interaction with progressively simpler fixed-
effects structures (that is, three models with two-way interactions
and one main effect, followed by a model with three main effects,
then three models with two main effects and finally three models
with just one main effect). See Table 5 below for the models that
had the best fit for our data and the values of their fixed-effects
parameters. Furthermore, see Appendix G for the t values associ-
ated with the fixed factors that did not have significant effects (i.e.,
were not included in the best models), and the series of likelihood
ratio tests performed in order to reach the best models.
The precritical region. In first-pass reading time there was a
familiarity-explicitness interaction—see Figure 4a. Post hoc tests
indicated that (a) the precritical region of familiar comments was
read faster if the context was explicit rather than implicit
(Mfp-familiar-explicit  262 ms, SEM  6 ms, Mfp-familiar-implicit 
283 ms, SEM  6 ms, 2(1, N  64)  6.6, p  .02), but (b) the
precritical region of unfamiliar comments were read in equal times
in explicit and implicit contexts (Mfp-unfamiliar-explicit  258 ms,
SEM  6 ms, Mfp-unfamiliar-implicit  248 ms, SEM  6 ms, 2(1,
N 64) 1.4, p .5). This indicates that even before the readers
knew whether the comment was going to be literal or sarcastic, the
context had an impact on the reading times of familiar comments,
but not on the unfamiliar ones.
In regression path reading time, the familiarity effect indicated
that the precritical region of familiar utterances was read slower
than that of unfamiliar ones—see Figure 4b. However, because
this specific comparison is between reading times on different
words, any simple main effects of familiarity are very difficult to
interpret meaningfully.
In total reading times, the literality main effect indicated that the
precritical region of literal comments was read faster (Mtt-literal 
343 ms, SEM  6 ms) than that of sarcastic comments (Mtt-sarcastic 
378 ms, SEM  7 ms) – see Figure 4c. The most likely interpre-
tation of the literality main effect is that the precritical region has
been reread more in sarcastic scenarios than in literal ones, which
might suggest a difficulty in the interpretation of the sarcastic
materials as predicted by the standard pragmatic model. The fa-
miliarity main effect indicated that the precritical region was read
faster in familiar than unfamiliar utterances, but as explained
above, the familiarity main effect alone cannot be interpreted
meaningfully.
The critical region. In first-pass reading time, there were two
main effects—see Figure 5a. The critical word of familiar utter-
ances was read faster (Mfp-familiar 223 ms, SEM 3 ms) than the
critical word of unfamiliar utterances (Mfp-unfamiliar  260 ms,
SEM  4 ms). Again, although this result is in the direction that
one might expect, it should be interpreted with caution, because
this specific comparison is between reading times on different
words (e.g., excited in the familiar condition vs. stirring in the
unfamiliar condition). The literality main effect indicated that the
critical word of a literal comment was read faster (Mfp-literal  237
ms, SEM  3 ms) than that of a sarcastic comment (Mfp-sarcastic 
248 ms, SEM  4 ms). This pattern of results supports the
predictions of the standard pragmatic model, indicating that in the
early processing stages, sarcasm seems to indeed be overall more
difficult to process than literal language, irrespective of familiarity
or contextual information.
In regression path reading time, an interaction was observed
between literality and familiarity - see Figure 5b. Post hoc com-
parisons showed that (a) unfamiliar utterances were slower to read
in the sarcastic condition than in the literal condition (Mrp-unfamiliar-literal
402 ms, SEM  14 ms, Mrp-unfamiliar-sarcastic  477 ms, SEM  17
ms): 2(1, N  64)  15.7, p 	 .001, and (b) familiar utterances
were read equally fast irrespective of whether they were sarcastic
or literal (Mrp-familiar-literal  311 ms, SEM  12 ms,
Mrp-familiar-sarcastic 333 ms, SEM 12 ms): 2(1, N 64) 0.8,
p  .8. This pattern of results fully supports the graded salience
hypothesis, but offers no support for the standard pragmatic model
or the implicit display theory. Sarcastic utterances do not always
take longer to read than literal ones (as the standard pragmatic
model would predict), and there is currently no evidence that they
are influenced by the strength of contextual information (as the
implicit display theory would predict). However, when they are
familiar, sarcastic utterances are read as fast as literal utterances, as
predicted by the graded salience hypothesis.
Table 4
Summary of 0-ms Reading Time Removal (Experiment 2)










Note. fp  first-pass; rp  regression path; tt  total reading time.
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Finally in total reading time, an interaction between literality and
familiarity was observed again—see Figure 5c. However, this time,
literal comments were read faster than sarcastic ones in both familiar
(Mtt-familiar-literal  264 ms, SEM  6 ms, Mtt-familiar-sarcastic  293
ms, SEM  8 ms, 2(1, N  64)  5.9, p  .03) and unfamiliar
conditions (Mtt-unfamiliar-literal  321 ms, SEM  8 ms,
Mtt-unfamiliar-sarcastic  377 ms, SEM  10 ms, 2(1, N  64) 
22.3, p 	 .001). This result suggested that the advantage for familiar
sarcastic comments did not carry over into the later stages of process-
ing, and instead both familiar and unfamiliar sarcastic comments
seemed to require additional processing time compared with literal
their counterparts. In line with the findings from Experiment 1, these
results also fail to support the implicit display theory, because the
explicitness of the speaker’s expectation did not facilitate sarcasm
processing in any of the conditions.
The postcritical region. In first-pass reading time, a main
effect of literality was observed—see Figure 6a. The region of text
following a literal utterance had shorter first-pass reading times
(Mfp-literal  411 ms, SEM  6 ms) than the region following a
sarcastic utterance (Mfp-sarcastic  453 ms, SEM  7 ms). In
regression path reading times and total reading times, two main
effects of literality and familiarity were observed—see Figure 6b
and 6c. The region of text following a literal utterance was read
faster (Mrp-literal  499 ms, SEM  11 ms; Mtt-literal  510 ms,
SEM  8 ms) than the region following a sarcastic utterance
(Mrp-sarcastic  590 ms, SEM  14 ms; Mtt-sarcastic  584 ms,
SEM  10 ms). Also the region following a familiar utterance was
read faster (Mrp-familiar 524 ms, SEM 12 ms; Mtt-familiar 533
ms, SEM  9 ms) than the region following an unfamiliar utter-
ance (Mrp-unfamiliar  565 ms, SEM  13 ms; Mtt-unfamiliar  561
ms, SEM 9 ms). These results seem to support the findings from
Experiment 1 and those observed in Filik and Moxey’s (2010)
study, which showed that the region of text following sarcastic utter-
ances is read more slowly than the text following literal utterances.
The current experiment showed that although familiarity offers an
advantage for the processing of familiar sarcastic utterances when
they are initially encountered (as evidenced in regression path reading
times on the disambiguating word), this advantage is lost in the later
stages of processing (as illustrated by the lack of an interaction
between literality and familiarity on the postcritical region).
General Discussion
Two experiments were carried out to contribute to the current
theoretical debate on the factors affecting sarcasm processing,
using tightly controlled materials, and a method (eye-tracking)
sensitive enough to reveal both early and late effects of our
manipulations. In both experiments, participants read short scenar-
ios while their eye movements were recorded. In Experiment 1, the
contexts of these scenarios either included an explicit expectation
Table 5




measure Model Fixed effects Coefficient SE t
Precritical fp  familiarity  explicitness  (1  literality | subject)  (1 | item) (Intercept) 257.9 9.6 26.9
Familiarity 3.3 8 0.4




rp  familiarity  (1  literality | subject)  (1 | item) (Intercept) 375.9 17 22.2
Familiarity 42.1 13.3 3.2
tt  literality  familiarity  (1  literality  explicitness | subject)  (1 | item) (Intercept) 328.5 15.9 20.7
Literality 37.9 9 4.2
Familiarity 23 8 2.9
Critical fp  literality  familiarity  (1  explicitness | subject)  (1  literality | item) (Intercept) 212.2 8 26.5
Literality 10.3 4.9 2.1
Familiarity 38.9 4.6 8.5
rp  literality  familiarity  (1  explicitness | subject)  (1  literality | item) (Intercept) 307.3 20.8 14.7
Literality 17.6 20.2 0.9




tt  literality  familiarity  (1  literality  familiarity | subject)  (1 | item) (Intercept) 258.7 13.2 19.6
Literality 26.5 10.9 2.4




Postcritical fp  literality  (1  literality  explicitness | subject)  (1 | item) (Intercept) 408.9 17.2 23.8
Literality 42.5 7.8 5.5
rp  literality  familiarity  (1  literality  familiarity | subject)  (1 | item) (Intercept) 470.7 23.9 19.7
Literality 90.4 22.5 4
Familiarity 46.7 17.7 2.6
tt  literality  familiarity  (1  literality  explicitness | subject) 
(1  literality | item)
(Intercept) 490.6 25.4 19.3
Literality 74.2 18.6 4
Familiarity 31.6 10.5 3
Note. fp  first-pass; rp  regression path; tt  total reading time.
1876 ‚TURCAN AND FILIK
of the speaker, or an implicit expectation, and they ended in either
a literal comment or an unfamiliar sarcastic one. This design was
used in order to test the conditions under which the predictions of
the modular accounts and the implicit display theory differ the
most. In Experiment 2 the familiarity of the sarcastic comment was
manipulated, in addition to explicitness of expectation, in order to
also assess the role of certain properties of the utterance itself in
sarcasm comprehension.
The Early Stages of Sarcasm Processing
In the two experiments reported here, initial processing was
considered to be reflected in the reading times of the critical word
before participants moved on to the next text region (that is,
first-pass and regression path reading times on the disambiguating
word). For this critical disambiguating region, we found that
unfamiliar sarcastic utterances took longer to read than literal
utterances (Experiments 1 and 2), but familiar sarcastic utterances
were read as quickly as literal ones (regression path reading times
in Experiment 2).
The results of both experiments are most in line with the
predictions made by the graded salience hypothesis, and less so
with those of the standard pragmatic model or the implicit display
theory. The familiarity of the target comments (rather than context
or their literality) seems to have an influence on the initial pro-
Figure 4. Mean reading times on the precritical region (Experiment 2).
Figure 4a: first-pass reading time. Figure 4b: regression path reading
time. Figure 4c: total reading time. Error bars represent  1SEM.
Figure 5. Mean reading times on the critical region (Experiment 2). Figure
5a: first-pass reading time. Figure 5b: regression path reading time. Figure 5c:
total reading time. Error bars represent  1SEM.
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cessing of sarcasm comprehension, in the direction predicted by
the graded salience hypothesis. In the early stages of processing,
when sarcastic utterances were familiar, they were read as fast as
literal utterances, while unfamiliar sarcastic utterances were read
more slowly than their literal counterparts. These results are in line
with those of Giora and her colleagues (1995, 1998, 2007), Filik
and Moxey (2010); Filik et al. (2014, Experiment 1), and Frisson
and Pickering (1999). Furthermore, they are also in line with those
of Filik et al.’s (2014) ERP study of irony processing. Filik et al.
found that in the N400 time range, the ERP amplitudes were
modulated by the literality and familiarity of the comment, in that
unfamiliar ironies had more negative-going amplitudes compared
with literal items, whereas an amplitude difference was not ob-
served between familiar sarcastic and literal utterances. This pat-
tern of results nicely mirrors our eye-tracking results for regression
path reading times on the critical region (Experiment 2), and stands
to show that when readers encounter the disambiguating word of
an unfamiliar irony, they take longer to read it, which seems to be
because of semantic difficulties associated with processing its
meaning (as reflected in the ERP). However, this semantic inte-
gration difficulty is not observed for the disambiguating word of
familiar ironies.
There were no main effects of the explicitness of the speaker’s
expectation, nor interactions of this factor with literality or famil-
iarity in the critical region (Experiments 1 and 2). These results do
not support the prediction of the implicit display theory that when
the degree of manifestness of an expectation in the context is high,
sarcastic utterances would be read as fast as literal ones, even
though we have offline evidence that a sarcastic utterance was
expected more when the context explicitly mentioned the speak-
er’s expectation. The two experiments reported in this article seem
to suggest that making a speaker’s expectation explicit in the
context did not facilitate comprehension of sarcasm. However,
because a role for context has been reported previously in the
literature, we believe that further research is needed to clarify
whether contexts with even more explicit expectations than those
employed in our study would elicit a functional effect on sarcasm
comprehension. Although we ensured that the difference between
the explicit and implicit conditions was statistically significant, it
is difficult to say just how explicit the speaker’s expectation needs
to be in order for us to observe a functional effect.
The Later Stages of Sarcasm Processing
In the two experiments reported here, we assume that later
stages of processing are reflected in measures of reading time after
the participants have first processed the critical region (that is, in
the total reading times on the precritical and critical region, and all
reading measures on the postcritical region).
Even though, as noted before, an interaction between literality
and familiarity was observed in the early reading measures on the
critical region in Experiment 2, this interaction was no longer
observed in the later reading stages, that is, familiar sarcastic
utterances lost their advantage and became more difficult to pro-
cess than literal ones. This reading pattern suggests that although
familiar sarcastic utterances have an initial advantage, they still
give rise to processing difficulties after the first reading, when
participants reread the disambiguating word. Therefore, in the later
stages of processing, sarcasm comprehension seems to have an
additional processing cost compared with literal language compre-
hension.
Our finding that familiarity effects disappear in the later stages
of sarcasm comprehension is in line with the results of Filik et al.’s
(2014) ERP experiment. They found that in the P600 time range,
the ERP amplitudes were only modulated by literality (and not
familiarity), with ironies showing more positive-going amplitudes
than literal utterances. De Grauwe, Swain, Holcomb, Ditman, and
Kuperberg’s (2010) ERP study of metaphor also points toward this
conclusion. Their study involved participants reading sentences
that contained either a familiar metaphor, or was simply a literal
clause. The results showed a P600 effect for metaphors as com-
Figure 6. Mean reading times on the postcritical region (Experiment 2).
Figure 6a: first-pass reading time. Figure 6b: regression path reading
time. Figure 6c: total reading time. Error bars represent  1SEM.
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pared with literal sentences, which was interpreted as a reflection
of the difficulties associated with the integration of figurative
utterances with the context.
An explanation provided for their result is that in the later stages
of comprehension, both the literal and figurative meanings are
activated. For sarcasm, it would mean that in the later stages of
processing there is an ongoing conflict between the literal and
ironic meanings of the sarcastic utterances, which is not affected
by the familiarity of the utterance. This conclusion is supported by
the indirect negation view proposed by Giora (1995), which pre-
dicts that both the literal and ironic meanings of a sarcastic
utterance are retained in the later stages of processing in order for
the difference between them to be computed.
With regards to the late effects of our contextual manipulation,
we found no evidence that making the speaker’s expectation
explicit in the context facilitates sarcasm comprehension. How-
ever, we did observe some evidence that the contextual manipu-
lation affected the reading time of literal utterances, which became
more difficult to process in implicit contexts (see first-pass reading
times on the postcritical region, Experiment 1). Therefore it is not
the case that our contextual manipulation did not have any effects,
it is only the case that it did not affect sarcasm processing in the
way predicted by the implicit display theory.
The finding that sarcasm comprehension is overall more diffi-
cult than literal language comprehension in the later stages of
processing could potentially be compatible with the predictions of
the standard pragmatic model, because according to this theory,
readers or listeners need to reanalyze the sarcastic materials before
making a correct interpretation, which would result in a processing
cost. However, the standard pragmatic model cannot explain the
early processing advantage of familiar sarcastic utterances as com-
pared with literal ones. On the other hand, the graded salience
hypothesis predicts the early ease of processing of sarcastic utter-
ances that we observed, and can also explain our findings for the
later stages of processing in terms of a conflict between the two
meanings of a sarcastic utterance (as explained above). Therefore,
it seems that out of the two modular accounts discussed in this
article, our results are more compatible with the graded salience
hypothesis than the standard pragmatic model.
The present results could also potentially be explained by the
constraint satisfaction model (Pexman, 2008). As described in the
Introduction, this framework theory allows for many unspecified
factors to affect sarcasm comprehension, and thus does not make clear
predictions about any specific factors. However, the constraint satis-
faction model could be used to frame our results, and we could
potentially now specify that one factor that affects sarcasm compre-
hension is the comment’s familiarity, but that we do not have any
evidence yet that the speaker’s expectation is also a factor.
In conclusion, by using experimental designs that could fully
test the role of sentence familiarity, and of contextual factors
(explicitness of speaker’s expectation) in sarcasm comprehension,
and by employing a sensitive and ecologically valid online meth-
odology, the results from the two experiments reported in this
article offer more support for the graded salience hypothesis than
the standard pragmatic model or the implicit display theory. The
familiarity of the meaning of a sarcastic utterance seems to influ-
ence its processing time, making it as easy to read as literal
utterances in the early stages of processing. However, this bene-
ficial effect does not seem to carry over to later stages of process-
ing, when sarcastic utterances take longer to process than literal
utterances, irrespective of degree of familiarity. These results are
best explained by the graded salience hypothesis and the indirect
negation view, because they seem to suggest that the familiarity of
a comment is an important factor in sarcasm processing, and that
both the literal and sarcastic meanings of a sarcastic comment may
be retained for further processing in the later stages of compre-
hension. We failed to support the prediction of the implicit display
theory that making the speaker’s expectation explicit in the context
would provide support for sarcasm comprehension (see also Giora
et al., 2009). However, just because this specific factor did not
have a visible functional effect on processing, does not mean that
other factors proposed by the implicit display theory could not
have one. This remains a question for future studies to address.
One potential goal for future studies could be to specify which
contextual factors do affect the time course of sarcasm compre-
hension, and transform the parallel constraint satisfaction model
from a framework theory, into a theory with clear testable predic-
tions.
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Appendix A
Selection of Experimental Materials for Experiment 1
Literality Explicitness Example scenario
Literal Explicit Sam and Tim were in a bar and wanted another round but ran out of money. Knowing how charismatic
Tim was, Sam asked him to go and charm the barmaid and get them two free drinks. Tim went up
to her, made a few witty jokes and got them the free drinks. “That was masterful!” Sam said to him.
They went home.
Implicit Sam and Tim were in a bar and wanted another round but ran out of money. They thought it might be
a good idea to try their luck at getting two free drinks from the barmaid. Tim went up to her, made
a few witty jokes and got them the free drinks. “That was masterful!” Sam said to him. They went
home.
Sarcastic Explicit Sam and Tim were in a bar and wanted another round but ran out of money. Knowing how charismatic
Tim was, Sam asked him to go and charm the barmaid and get them two free drinks. Tim went up
to her, made a bad joke, and the barmaid just laughed at him. “That was masterful!” Sam said to
him. They went home.
Implicit Sam and Tim were in a bar and wanted another round but ran out of money. They thought it might be
a good idea to try their luck at getting two free drinks from the barmaid. Tim went up to her, made
a bad joke, and the barmaid just laughed at him. “That was masterful!” Sam said to him. They went
home.
Literal Explicit Paul and Matt went camping together for the weekend. This was Paul’s first time camping, so he asked
Matt to bring all the necessary equipment. Matt arrived at the campsite with everything they needed.
“You’re equipped so well!” Paul said to him. They were hungry.
Implicit Paul and Matt went camping together for the weekend. They hadn’t been outside the city in a long
time and were really looking forward to spending some time in nature. Matt arrived at the campsite
with everything they needed. “You’re equipped so well!” Paul said to him. They were hungry.
Sarcastic Explicit Paul and Matt went camping together for the weekend. This was Paul’s first time camping, so he asked
Matt to bring all the necessary equipment. Matt arrived at the campsite with nothing but plastic
cutlery. “You’re equipped so well!” Paul said to him. They were hungry.
Implicit Paul and Matt went camping together for the weekend. They hadn’t been outside the city in a long
time and were really looking forward to spending some time in nature. Matt arrived at the campsite
with nothing but plastic cutlery. “You’re equipped so well!” Paul said to him. They were hungry.
Literal Explicit Josh and Jane had been living together for over a year now. Josh typically didn’t mind doing housework so
one morning she asked him to clean the kitchen. When she came home, Josh had already made the
kitchen sparkle clean. “Your help is priceless!” she said to Josh. They then watched TV.
Implicit Josh and Jane had been living together for over a year now. Jane was always working late, but today
was her turn to clean the kitchen so she was going to do it in the evening. When she came home,
Josh had already made the kitchen sparkle clean. “Your help is priceless!” she said to Josh. They
then watched TV.
Sarcastic Explicit Josh and Jane had been living together for over a year now. Josh typically didn’t mind doing housework so
one morning she asked him to clean the kitchen. When she came home, Josh had made an even bigger
mess in the kitchen. “Your help is priceless!” she said to Josh. They then watched TV.
Implicit Josh and Jane had been living together for over a year now. Jane was always working late, but today
was her turn to clean the kitchen so she was going to do it in the evening. When she came home,
Josh had made an even bigger mess in the kitchen. “Your help is priceless!” she said to Josh. They
then watched TV.
Literal Explicit Cara and Eve were in a supermarket doing food shopping and were queuing to pay. Cara asked Eve to
carefully put all the food in bags so that they could easily carry them to the car. Eve managed to fit
everything in two bags. “You packed them great!” Cara said to her. They drove home.
Implicit Cara and Eve were in a supermarket doing food shopping and were queuing to pay. They were
preparing a Christmas meal for both their families who were coming to visit. Eve managed to fit
everything in two bags. “You packed them great!” Cara said to her. They drove home.
Sarcastic Explicit Cara and Eve were in a supermarket doing food shopping and were queuing to pay. Cara asked Eve to
carefully put all the food in bags so that they could easily carry them to the car. Eve packed the eggs
under the turkey and broke them all. “You packed them great!” Cara said to her. They drove home.
Implicit Cara and Eve were in a supermarket doing food shopping and were queuing to pay. They were
preparing a Christmas meal for both their families who were coming to visit. Eve packed the eggs
under the turkey and broke them all. “You packed them great!” Cara said to her. They drove home.
Literal Explicit Lilly and Kim were about to set off on a long journey. Lilly was going to drive and she asked Kim to
fill up the petrol tank the night before. When they were about to leave, Lilly saw that Kim




Implicit Lilly and Kim were about to set off on a long journey. They both loved travelling and were now about
to go on a hiking trip for their holidays. When they were about to leave, Lilly saw that Kim
remembered to fill up the petrol tank. “Your help is indispensable!” she said to Kim. They drove off.
Sarcastic Explicit Lilly and Kim were about to set off on a long journey. Lilly was going to drive and she asked Kim to
fill up the petrol tank the night before. When they were about to leave, Lilly saw that Kim had
forgotten to fill up the petrol tank. “Your help is indispensable!” she said to Kim. They drove off.
Implicit Lilly and Kim were about to set off on a long journey. They both loved travelling and were now about
to go on a hiking trip for their holidays. When they were about to leave, Lilly saw that Kim had
forgotten to fill up the petrol tank. “Your help is indispensable!” she said to Kim. They drove off.
Appendix B
Results of Stimulus Norming Tests (Experiment 1)
Stimulus Norming 1: Familiarity
The purpose of this test was to ensure that all of the target
utterances used in this experiment were unfamiliar. A familiarity
questionnaire was devised, which contained 178 utterances, pre-
sented out of context. Thirteen volunteers were recruited (Mage 
28 years and 1 month, SD  6 years and 1 month, 7 females and
6 males) and asked to rate how familiar they were with each
utterance used sarcastically, on a scale from 1 (unfamiliar) to 8
(familiar). The 24 unfamiliar utterances for this experiment were
then selected from the lowest rated ones and they had a mean of
2.6 (SD  0.5, min  1.38, max  3.62).
Stimulus Norming 2: Explicitness Manipulation
The purpose of this test was to verify whether there was a clear
perceived difference between the explicit and implicit expectation
conditions. Fifty-six potential materials were divided into two
questionnaires, so that each participant saw only one version of
each scenario, either the explicit or the implicit one. Materials
were not presented in their entirety, but only up to the second
sentence, which either contained or did not contain the expecta-
tion. Each scenario was followed by a question, for example for
the scenario in Table 1: “Based only on what you’ve read, does
Dean have an expectation for Chloe to suggest an exciting activity
for them to do on their final day in Valencia?” Nineteen volunteers
were recruited (Mage  26 years and 4 months, SD  5 years and
10 months, 9 females and 10 males) and asked to answer the
question by rating each scenario on a scale from 1 (no such
expectation) to 8 (clear expectation). We then selected for use in
Experiment 1 the 24 scenarios that had the most extreme differ-
ence score between the explicit and the implicit conditions, and
conducted a paired-samples t test: the explicit expectation condi-
tion had significantly higher ratings (M  7.17, SD  0.56) than
the implicit expectation condition (M  1.95, SD  0.52), t(21) 
29.82, p 	 .001.
Stimulus Norming 3: Expectation for Sarcasm
The purpose of this test was to verify that, as the implicit display
theory predicts, an expectation for sarcasm is increased when an
expectation is made explicit in the context and then broken. In
other words, for the conditions of the implicit display theory to be
met, we would need to observe an interaction between literality
and explicitness, such that for sarcastic comments, the expectation
for sarcasm is increased in an explicit context compared with an
implicit one. We presented 24 participants (Mage  25 years and 6
months, SD  10 years and 6 months, 17 females and 7 males)
with the experimental scenarios (minus the target comments), and
asked them to rate on a scale from 1 (sarcasm very unlikely) to 8
(sarcasm very likely) how likely they think it is that one character
will say something sarcastic to the other character (e.g., for the
example in Table 1, “Do you expect that Dean will now say
something sarcastic to Chloe?”). The materials were randomized
and divided into four versions of the questionnaire, so that one
participant only saw each scenario in one condition.
The data were analyzed with a linear mixed effects model (lme4
package in R), and the results suggested that there was a significant
interaction between literality and explicitness. Post hoc tests were
performed using the testInteractions function from the phia pack-
age in R (where the chi-square is the default post hoc test) and
Bonferroni-corrected p values are reported. Sarcasm was expected
more in explicit scenarios than in implicit ones, only if the expec-
tation in the context was broken (Mexplicit  5.99, SEM  0.16,
Mimplicit 5.45, SEM 0.17, 2(1, N 24) 5.5, p .038), but
equally expected if it was met (Mexplicit  2.15, SEM  0.14,
Mimplicit 2.37, SEM 0.16, 2(1, N 24) 0.6, p .9). These
results support the implicit display theory’s offline prediction, and
also reassure us that our materials were optimized for detecting
contextual effects.
Stimulus Norming 4: Naturalness
The purpose of this test was to check whether there were any
differences between conditions in how natural the materials
(Appendices continue)
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sounded. The materials were presented in their entirety to the
participants, and they were asked to rate on a scale from 1
(unnatural) to 8 (natural) how natural sounding or coherent the
materials were. The scenarios were divided into four question-
naires, so that each participant only saw each scenario in one
condition. Each questionnaire contained six materials from each
condition, and additionally six unnatural sounding materials,
which were included as controls. These materials had the same
structure as the experimental ones, but made no logical sense. Data
from 23 participants (Mage  18 years and 8 months, SD  8
months, 22 females and 1 male) were analyzed in R (lme4 pack-
age), and results indicated that there was a main effect of literality.
Literal scenarios were rated as significantly more natural sounding
(Mliteral  6.32, SEM  0.1) than sarcastic scenarios (Msarcastic 
5.40, SEM  0.1). However, when we compared the experimental
materials from each condition with the ratings of the unnatural
materials (paired-samples t tests), all experimental materials were
rated as significantly more natural (all ps 	 0.001) than the
unnatural ones (Munnatural  1.75, SEM  0.1).
Although it is reassuring that all the experimental materials were
perceived as more natural that the control unnatural scenarios, it is
worth noting that the discrepancy in naturalness ratings between
literal and sarcastic scenarios might potentially explain some of the
reading time differences observed between them. However, it is
not possible to control for naturalness because of the very nature of
sarcasm—devising a sarcastic interchange that is as natural as a
literal equivalent seems unlikely, simply because of the fact that
sarcasm is globally more rarely used than literal language.
Stimulus Norming 5: Sarcasm Rating
The purpose of this test was to verify whether the perception of
how sarcastic the target utterance was differed between conditions.
The experimental materials were divided into four questionnaires
(each scenario was presented in only one condition in each ques-
tionnaire). Twenty-four participants (Mage  30 years and 11
months, SD  12 years and 2 months, 13 females and 11 males)
were asked to rate them on a scale from 1 (not at all sarcastic) to
8 (very sarcastic) in terms of how sarcastic they thought the final
comments were. Data were analyzed in R (lme4 package), and the
results indicated that there was an interaction between literality
and explicitness. Post hoc tests showed that literal stories were
consistently rated as significantly less sarcastic than sarcastic sce-
narios, in both explicit (Mliteral  1.6, SEM  0.08, Msarcastic 
6.7, SEM  0.15, 2(1, N  24)  283.7, p 	 .001) and implicit
scenarios (Mliteral  2.1, SEM  0.13, Msarcastic  6.6, SEM 
0.14, 2(1, N  24)  235.7, p 	 .001). Literal scenarios were
rated as slightly more sarcastic when the expectation in the context
was implicit (Mimplicit  2.1, SEM  0.13) than when it was
explicit (Mexplicit  1.6, SEM  0.08), 2(1, N  24)  7.6, p 
.01, but there was no difference in how sarcastic scenarios were
rated in explicit and implicit contexts (Mexplicit  6.7, SEM 
0.15, Mimplicit  6.6, SEM  0.14, 2(1, N  24)  0.07, p  1).
Even though literal comments in implicit contexts appeared to
be slightly more sarcastic than literal comments in explicit con-
texts, they did not approach the ratings of sarcastic utterances;
hence the literality manipulation was effective regardless of con-
text. Additionally, in this experiment the predictions were not
concerned with comparing the reading times between literal utter-
ances in explicit and implicit contexts, but rather between literal
and sarcastic utterances in explicit and implicit contexts; therefore,
there is no reason to suspect that the slight rating difference
between literal explicit and literal implicit scenarios would have





Selection of Filler Items for Experiment 1
Two characters  literal negative comment
Barbara and Carlos went into town one afternoon to have a walk. The weather forecast predicted it would be sunny and warm all day long. While they were
in town, it suddenly started raining heavily and they didn’t have an umbrella. “The forecast is unreliable!” Barbara said to Carlos. They went home.
Cal was working on a miniature house model he had to build for his architecture course. He was behind schedule and Chris offered to help out by
fitting the windows. His work started progressing much faster but he was still pressed for time. “I hate working under stress!” Cal said to Chris.
They did their best.
Felicia and Daphne were shopping for a dress. In the last shop they entered, Felicia tried on a red one that she really liked. However the dress was too
small for her and there were no other sizes in the shop. “I’m just not lucky today!” Felicia said to Daphne. They went home.
Informative texts
When my car broke down a few nights ago, the first thing I did was to get it out of the road, in a safe place. Once I was there, I called the AA of
course. They managed to locate me using the GPS function on my phone. I waited for them for about an hour, but they fixed it quickly when they
arrived.
On a Sunday afternoon, we all decided to go grocery shopping in order to make pancakes later in the evening. We had to buy flour, sugar, eggs and a
bit of milk. The trouble was, we couldn’t decide what to fill them with, so we got everything: chocolate spread, jam, ice cream and bananas.
Everybody should visit Iceland. It’s so staggeringly beautiful and otherworldly. Everywhere you turn there are glaciers, waterfalls, lava fields,
rainbows, streams and mountain ranges. It’s also an ideal destination if you want to see the Northern Lights, especially if you go between February
and March.
Two characters  literal positive comment
Harry and Tara were looking to rent a flat in Nottingham. They’d already seen several flats, and had their heart set on one of them. When they called
the agency, they found out that their favourite flat was still available. “That’s such great news!” Tara said. They soon moved in.
Greg and Rick had no plans for Friday evening. They rented the “Matrix” trilogy because they had never watched it before. The movies were so good
that they stayed awake all night in order to finish them by morning. “These movies are amazing!” Greg said at the end. They went to sleep.
Rose and Nell wanted to buy a present together for a friend’s birthday. They bought her a classical music CD from the new music shop in town. Their
friend was very happy about the gift since she had wanted to buy it herself for a while. “This was such a good gift!” Rose said to Nell. They
listened to the CD.
(Appendices continue)
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Appendix D
The t Values of Nonsignificant Fixed Effects and p Values of Likelihood Ratio Tests (Experiment 1)
Table D1
Table for the t Values of the Nonsignificant Fixed Effects
Analysis region Reading measure
Fixed effects
(from full model) t
Precritical fp Literality 0.6
Explicitness 0.9
Literality  explicitness 0.9
rp Literality 0.4
Literality  explicitness 0.2
tt Literality 0.8
Explicitness 0.2
Literality  explicitness 0.1
Critical fp Literality 1.8
Explicitness .001
Literality  explicitness 0.8
rp Explicitness 0.2
Literality  explicitness 0.4
tt Explicitness 0.6
Literality  explicitness 0.4
Postcritical fp
rp Explicitness 0.03
Literality  explicitness 0.4
tt Explicitness 1.3
Literality  explicitness 1.4
Note. As a rule of thumb, only effects with |t| 




Series of Likelihood Ratio Tests, Their AIC, and p Values (Experiment 1)
Model number Fixed-effects structure AIC p (vs. Model no.)
fp—precritical
1 Literality  explicitness 7,775
2 Literality  explicitness 7,774 .4 (vs. 1)
3 Literality 7,775 .077 (vs. 2)
4 Explicitness 7,772 .9 (vs. 2)
5 Intercept 7,773 .9 (vs. 3).07 (vs. 4)
rp—precritical
1 Literality  explicitness 8,638
2 Literality  explicitness 8,636 .8 (vs. 1)
3 Literality 8,640 .015 (vs. 2)
4 Explicitness 8,635 .7 (vs. 2)
5 Intercept 8,639 .015 (vs. 4)
tt—precritical
1 Literality  explicitness 9339
2 Literality  explicitness 9,337 .9 (vs. 1)
3 Literality 9,335 .8 (vs. 2)
4 Explicitness 9,336 .3 (vs. 2)
5 Intercept 9,334 .3 (vs. 3).7 (vs. 4)
fp—critical
1 Literality  explicitness 8,643
2 Literality  explicitness 8,642 .4 (vs. 1)
3 Literality 8,641 .4 (vs. 2)
4 Explicitness 8,643 .078 (vs. 2)
5 Intercept 8,642 .062 (vs. 3).3 (vs. 4)
rp—critical
1 Literality  explicitness 9,555
2 Literality  explicitness 9,553 .7 (vs. 1)
3 Literality 9,551 .6 (vs. 2)
4 Explicitness 9,563 	.001 (vs. 2)
5 Intercept 9,562 	.001 (vs. 3)
tt—critical
1 Literality  explicitness 9,372
2 Literality  explicitness 9,370 .7 (vs. 1)
3 Literality 9,370 .3 (vs. 2)
4 Explicitness 9,380 	.001 (vs. 2)





2 Literality  explicitness 9,994 .019 (vs. 1)
rp—postcritical
1 Literality  explicitness 10,852
2 Literality  explicitness 10,850 .7 (vs. 1)
3 Literality 10,848 .6 (vs. 2)
4 Explicitness 10,854 .01 (vs. 2)
5 Intercept 10,852 .01 (vs. 3)
tt—postcritical
1 Literality  explicitness 10,408
2 Literality  explicitness 10,408 .2 (vs. 1)
3 Literality 10,406 .7 (vs. 2)
4 Explicitness 10,413 .01 (vs. 2)
5 Intercept 10,411 .01 (vs. 3)
Note. In this table, the fixed-effects structure gets progressively simpler at every step; a p value 	 .05 suggests that the
better model fit is the one with the more complex fixed-effects structure out of the two models being compared; similarly,
a p value 
 .05 suggests that it is the simpler fixed-effects structure that best describes the data. The fixed-effects structure
of the best model fit is in boldface. AIC  Akaike’s information criterion (the smaller the AIC, the better the model fit;
Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004).
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Appendix E
Selection of Experimental Materials for Experiment 2
Literality Familiarity Explicitness Example scenario
Literal Familiar Explicit Rachel was a model for her friend Nikki’s fashion show. Nikki told Rachel
how important this show was and asked her to strive for a perfect look.
When she was about to go on stage, Rachel had a flawless make-up and
beautifully fixed hair. “Looking good!” Nikki said to Rachel. She was
nervous.
Implicit Rachel was a model for her friend Nikki’s fashion show. This was an
important show for Nikki’s career as many people from the industry
were attending. When she was about to go on stage, Rachel had a
flawless make-up and beautifully fixed hair. “Looking good!” Nikki said
to Rachel. She was nervous.
Unfamiliar Explicit Rachel was a model for her friend Nikki’s fashion show. Nikki told Rachel
how important this show was and asked her to strive for a perfect look.
When she was about to go on stage, Rachel had a flawless make-up and
beautifully fixed hair. “Your look is very chic!” Nikki said to Rachel.
She was nervous.
Implicit Rachel was a model for her friend Nikki’s fashion show. This was an
important show for Nikki’s career as many people from the industry
were attending. When she was about to go on stage, Rachel had a
flawless make-up and beautifully fixed hair. “Your look is very chic!”
Nikki said to Rachel. She was nervous.
Sarcastic Familiar Explicit Rachel was a model for her friend Nikki’s fashion show. Nikki told Rachel
how important this show was and asked her to strive for a perfect look.
When she was about to go on stage, Rachel’s make-up had worn off and
her hair was in a messy state. “Looking good!” Nikki said to Rachel.
She was nervous.
Implicit Rachel was a model for her friend Nikki’s fashion show. This was an
important show for Nikki’s career as many people from the industry
were attending. When she was about to go on stage, Rachel’s make-up
had worn off and her hair was in a messy state. “Looking good!” Nikki
said to Rachel. She was nervous.
Unfamiliar Explicit Rachel was a model for her friend Nikki’s fashion show. Nikki told Rachel
how important this show was and asked her to strive for a perfect look.
When she was about to go on stage, Rachel’s make-up had worn off and
her hair was in a messy state. “Your look is very chic!” Nikki said to
Rachel. She was nervous.
Implicit Rachel was a model for her friend Nikki’s fashion show. This was an
important show for Nikki’s career as many people from the industry
were attending. When she was about to go on stage, Rachel’s make-up
had worn off and her hair was in a messy state. “Your look is very
chic!” Nikki said to Rachel. She was nervous.
Literal Familiar Explicit Daisy had a statistics coursework to do and she was having trouble with it.
She asked her friend Iris to have a look since Iris had helped her before
with stats. Iris sat with Daisy for an hour and explained to her
everything she had to do. “That was really helpful!” Daisy said to her.
She needed a high mark.
Implicit Daisy had a statistics coursework to do and she was having trouble with it.
When she got really confused, she asked her friend Iris to have a look.
Iris sat with Daisy for an hour and explained to her everything she had
to do. “That was really helpful!” Daisy said to her. She needed a high
mark.
Unfamiliar Explicit Daisy had a statistics coursework to do and she was having trouble with it.
She asked her friend Iris to have a look since Iris had helped her before
with stats. Iris sat with Daisy for an hour and explained to her
everything she had to do. “Your help was priceless!” Daisy said to her.
She needed a high mark.
Implicit Daisy had a statistics coursework to do and she was having trouble with it.
When she got really confused, she asked her friend Iris to have a look.
Iris sat with Daisy for an hour and explained to her everything she had





Sarcastic Familiar Explicit Daisy had a statistics coursework to do and she was having trouble with it.
She asked her friend Iris to have a look since Iris had helped her before
with stats. Iris wasn’t up for it so she gave a brief explanation that
confused Daisy more. “That was really helpful!” Daisy said to her. She
needed a high mark.
Implicit Daisy had a statistics coursework to do and she was having trouble with it.
When she got really confused, she asked her friend Iris to have a look.
Iris wasn’t up for it so she gave a brief explanation that only confused
Daisy more. “That was really helpful!” Daisy said to her. She needed a
high mark.
Unfamiliar Explicit Daisy had a statistics coursework to do and she was having trouble with it.
She asked her friend Iris to have a look since Iris had helped her before
with stats. Iris wasn’t up for it so she gave a brief explanation that only
confused Daisy more. “Your help was priceless!” Daisy said to her. She
needed a high mark.
Implicit Daisy had a statistics coursework to do and she was having trouble with it.
When she got really confused, she asked her friend Iris to have a look.
Iris wasn’t up for it so she gave a brief explanation that only confused
Daisy more. “Your help was priceless!” Daisy said to her. She needed a
high mark.
Literal Familiar Explicit Hugo and Liz had to give a presentation together on Monday as part of the
assignment for one of their modules. Hugo needed a high mark so he
asked Liz to come well prepared. Liz and Hugo both gave excellent
presentations so they got a high mark. “Well that went well!” he said to
her. They went home.
Implicit Hugo and Liz had to give a presentation together on Monday as part of the
assignment for one of their modules. It was the module with the highest
number of credits for their degree. Liz and Hugo both gave excellent
presentations so they got a high mark. “Well that went well!” he said to
her. They went home.
Unfamiliar Explicit Hugo and Liz had to give a presentation together on Monday as part of the
assignment for one of their modules. Hugo needed a high mark so he
asked Liz to come well prepared. Liz and Hugo both gave excellent
presentations so they got a high mark. “Our talk was impeccable!” he
said to her. They went home.
Implicit Hugo and Liz had to give a presentation together on Monday as part of the
assignment for one of their modules. It was the module with the highest
number of credits for their degree. Liz and Hugo both gave excellent
presentations so they got a high mark. “Our talk was impeccable!” he
said to her. They went home.
Sarcastic Familiar Explicit Hugo and Liz had to give a presentation together on Monday as part of the
assignment for one of their modules. Hugo needed a high mark so he
asked Liz to come well prepared. Hugo did well but Liz was very poorly
prepared so they got a low mark. “Well that went well!” he said to her.
They went home.
Implicit Hugo and Liz had to give a presentation together on Monday as part of the
assignment for one of their modules. It was the module with the highest
number of credits for their degree. Hugo did well but Liz was very
poorly prepared so they got a low mark. “Well that went well!” he said
to her. They went home.
Unfamiliar Explicit Hugo and Liz had to give a presentation together on Monday as part of the
assignment for one of their modules. Hugo needed a high mark so he
asked Liz to come well prepared. Hugo did well but Liz was very poorly
prepared so they got a low mark. “Our talk was impeccable!” he said to
her. They went home.
Implicit Hugo and Liz had to give a presentation together on Monday as part of the
assignment for one of their modules. It was the module with the highest
number of credits for their degree. Hugo did well but Liz was very
poorly prepared so they got a low mark. “Our talk was impeccable!” he
said to her. They went home.
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Appendix E (continued)
Literal Familiar Explicit Amy was almost done writing her final year dissertation when her laptop
froze. She knew her friend Rob was very good at computers and could
fix it so she asked for his help. He managed to unfreeze the computer
and she retrieved her work. “Ahh brilliant!” she said to him. He then
went home.
Implicit Amy was almost done writing her final year dissertation when her laptop
froze. Her friend Rob was in the house at the time and came over to see
what had happened. He managed to unfreeze the computer and she
retrieved her work. “Ahh brilliant!” she said to him. He then went home.
Unfamiliar Explicit Amy was almost done writing her final year dissertation when her laptop
froze. She knew her friend Rob was very good at computers and could
fix it so she asked for his help. He managed to unfreeze the computer
and she retrieved her work. “You were very helpful!” she said to him.
He then went home.
Implicit Amy was almost done writing her final year dissertation when her laptop
froze. Her friend Rob was in the house at the time and came over to see
what had happened. He managed to unfreeze the computer and she
retrieved her work. “You were very helpful!” she said to him. He then
went home.
Sarcastic Familiar Explicit Amy was almost done writing her final year dissertation when her laptop
froze. She knew her friend Rob was very good at computers and could
fix it so she asked for his help. He pressed the wrong button, the
computer died and all her work was lost. “Ahh brilliant!” she said to
him. He then went home.
Implicit Amy was almost done writing her final year dissertation when her laptop
froze. Her friend Rob was in the house at the time and came over to see
what had happened. He pressed the wrong button, the computer died and
all her work was lost. “Ahh brilliant!” she said to him. He then went
home.
Unfamiliar Explicit Amy was almost done writing her final year dissertation when her laptop
froze. She knew her friend Rob was very good at computers and could
fix it so she asked for his help. He pressed the wrong button, the
computer died and all her work was lost. “You were very helpful!” she
said to him. He then went home.
Implicit Amy was almost done writing her final year dissertation when her laptop
froze. Her friend Rob was in the house at the time and came over to see
what had happened. He pressed the wrong button, the computer died and
all her work was lost. “You were very helpful!” she said to him. He
then went home.
Literal Familiar Explicit Donna was not feeling well and was resting in bed. She had just cleaned
her room so she asked her friend Jay to be extra careful not to spill her
soup when bringing it over from the kitchen. He brought it to Donna
without spilling a single drop. “So careful!” she said to him. He sat
down.
Implicit Donna was not feeling well and was resting in bed. Her mom had left her
a bowl of soup in the kitchen so Donna asked her friend Jay to bring it
to her. He brought it to Donna without spilling a single drop. “So
careful!” she said to him. He sat down.
Unfamiliar Explicit Donna was not feeling well and was resting in bed. She had just cleaned
her room so she asked her friend Jay to be extra careful not to spill her
soup when bringing it over from the kitchen. He brought it to Donna
without spilling a single drop. “Your balance is so good!” she said to
him. He sat down.
Implicit Donna was not feeling well and was resting in bed. Her mom had left her
a bowl of soup in the kitchen so Donna asked her friend Jay to bring it
to her. He brought it to Donna without spilling a single drop. “Your




Sarcastic Familiar Explicit Donna was not feeling well and was resting in bed. She had just cleaned
her room so she asked her friend Jay to be extra careful not to spill her
soup when bringing it over from the kitchen. He managed to spill almost
all of it on the floor in her room. “So careful!” she said to him. He sat
down.
Implicit Donna was not feeling well and was resting in bed. Her mom had left her
a bowl of soup in the kitchen so Donna asked her friend Jay to bring it
to her. He managed to spill almost all of it on the floor in her room. “So
careful!” she said to him. He sat down.
Unfamiliar Explicit Donna was not feeling well and was resting in bed. She had just cleaned
her room so she asked her friend Jay to be extra careful not to spill her
soup when bringing it over from the kitchen. He managed to spill almost
all of it on the floor in her room. “Your balance is so good!” she said to
him. He sat down.
Implicit Donna was not feeling well and was resting in bed. Her mom had left her
a bowl of soup in the kitchen so Donna asked her friend Jay to bring it
to her. He managed to spill almost all of it on the floor in her room.
“Your balance is so good!” she said to him. He sat down.
Appendix F
Results of Stimulus Norming Tests (Experiment 2)
Stimulus Norming 1: Familiarity
The 48 sarcastic utterances were selected from the 178 possible
utterances in the familiarity questionnaire mentioned in Experi-
ment 1. A paired-samples t test comparing the ratings of the
familiar and unfamiliar utterances showed that the familiar utter-
ances were rated as significantly more familiar (Mfamiliar  6.24,
SD  0.86) than the unfamiliar ones (Munfamiliar  2.81, SD 
0.83), t(47)  21.12, p 	 .001.
Stimulus Norming 2: Explicitness Manipulation
The data from the test from Experiment 1 were also used to
select the materials for the second experiment. The 48 contexts
were chosen from the 56 possible contexts in the expectation
questionnaire, by selecting the ones that had the largest difference
in ratings between the explicit and the implicit conditions. A
paired-samples t test was then conducted in order to compare
between the ratings for the explicit and the implicit expectation
conditions. The explicit expectations condition had significantly
higher ratings (Mexplicit  7.02, SD  0.74) than the implicit
expectations condition (Mimplicit 3.08, SD 1.41), t(47) 16.7,
p 	 .001.
Stimulus Norming 3: Expectation for Sarcasm
The next three tests had exactly the same structure and proce-
dure as the ones in Experiment 1. Twenty-four participants com-
pleted the test (Mage  27 years and 1 month, SD  8 years, 15
females and 9 males). The data were analyzed in R (lme4 pack-
age), and the results suggested that there was a significant inter-
action between literality and explicitness on the expectation for
sarcasm ratings. Sarcasm was expected more in explicit scenarios
than in implicit ones, only if the expectation from the context was
broken (Mexplicit  5.59, SEM  0.12, Mimplicit  5.12, SEM 
0.12, 2(1, N  24)  10.2, p  .002), but equally expected if it
was met (Mexplicit  2.17, SEM  0.09, Mimplicit  2.46, SEM 
0.11, 2(1, N  24)  3.6, p  .1). These results suggest, as in
Experiment 1, that the experimental materials are suitable to test
the predictions of the implicit display theory.
Stimulus Norming 4: Naturalness
Twenty-four participants took part (Mage  18 years and 6
months, SD  6 months, 20 females and 4 males). The data were
analyzed in R (lme4 package), and the results indicated that there
were two main effects, of literality and familiarity. Literal scenar-
ios were rated as more natural (Mliteral  6.62, SEM  0.06) than
sarcastic ones (Msarcastic  5.59, SEM  0.07), and also familiar
scenarios were rated as more natural (Mfamiliar  6.27, SEM 
0.07) than unfamiliar ones (Munfamiliar  5.94, SEM  0.07).
However, as in Experiment 1, scenarios in each condition were
rated as significantly more natural than the unnatural controls (all
ps 	 0.001, Munnatural  1.55, SEM  0.06).
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Stimulus Norming 5: Sarcasm Rating
Forty-eight participants took part (Mage  25 years and 3
months, SD  7 years and 9 months, 25 females and 23 males).
The data were analyzed in R (lme4 package), and the results
indicated that there was an interaction between literality and fa-
miliarity. Post hoc tests showed that sarcasm ratings were signif-
icantly higher for sarcastic scenarios than for literal ones, irrespec-
tive of familiarity (Msarcastic-familiar  7.07, SEM  0.06,
Mliteral-familiar  1.59, SEM  0.07, 2(1, N  48)  665, p 	
.001, Msarcastic-unfamiliar  6.88, SEM  0.07, Mliteral-unfamiliar 
1.95, SEM  0.07, 2(1, N  48)  561.8, p 	 .001). Familiar
scenarios were rated marginally higher than unfamiliar ones in
sarcastic scenarios (Msarcastic-familiar  7.07, SEM  0.06,
Msarcastic-unfamiliar  6.88, SEM  0.07, 2(1, N  48)  5.5, p 
.038), and rated the same in literal scenarios (Mliteral-familiar 1.59,
SEM  0.07, Mliteral-unfamiliar  1.95, SEM  0.07, 2(1, N 
48)  1.4, p  .5). The literality effect was completely expected:
sarcastic comments were rated as significantly more sarcastic than
literal scenarios. The difference between familiar and unfamiliar
sarcastic comments, statistically significant yet extremely small in
magnitude (a difference of 0.19 rating points), was perhaps also
not surprising, seeing how by definition, readers are more exposed
to and more accustomed to hearing the familiar comments as
sarcastic rather than the unfamiliar ones.
Appendix G
The t Values of Nonsignificant Fixed Effects and p Values of Likelihood Ratio Tests (Experiment 2)
Table G1
Series of Likelihood Ratio Tests, Their AIC, and p Values (Experiment 1)
Analysis region Reading measure Fixed effects (from full model) t
Precritical fp Literality .5
Literality  explicitness 1
Literality  familiarity .6
Literality  familiarity  explicitness 1.6
rp Literality .1
Explicitness .1
Literality  explicitness .8
Literality  familiarity .8
Explicitness  familiarity .2
Literality  familiarity  explicitness .9
tt Explicitness .4
Literality  explicitness .9
Literality  familiarity 1.9
Explicitness  familiarity 1.4
Literality  familiarity  explicitness 1.8
Critical fp Explicitness .3
Literality  explicitness .9
Literality  familiarity .04
Explicitness  familiarity .2
Literality  familiarity  explicitness 1
rp Explicitness147–2 1.2
Literality  explicitness .8
Explicitness  familiarity 1.5
Literality  familiarity  explicitness .8
tt Explicitness .4
Literality  explicitness .03
Explicitness  familiarity .5
Literality  familiarity  explicitness .03
Postcritical fp Explicitness .2
Familiarity .4
Literality  explicitness .2
Literality  familiarity .5
Explicitness  familiarity .5
Literality  familiarity  explicitness 1
rp Explicitness .9
Literality  explicitness 1
Literality  familiarity 1
Explicitness  familiarity .7
Literality  familiarity  explicitness .6
tt Explicitness .05
Literality  explicitness .7
Literality  familiarity .5
Explicitness  familiarity 1.1
Literality  familiarity  explicitness 1.2
Note. As a rule of thumb, only effects with |t| 




Series of Likelihood Ratio Tests, Their AIC, and p Values (Experiment 2)
Model number Fixed-effects structure AIC p (vs. model no.)
fp—precritical
1 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 31,202
2 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 31,206 .02 (vs. 1)
3 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 31,207 .015 (vs. 1)
4 Familiarity  explicitness  literality 31,200 .3 (vs. 1)
5 Familiarity  explicitness 31,199 .2 (vs. 4)
6 Familiarity  explicitness 31,204 .008 (vs. 5)
rp—precritical
1 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 35,390
2 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 35,385 .8 (vs. 1)
3 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 35,385 .8 (vs. 1)
4 Familiarity  explicitness  literality 35,385 .8 (vs. 1)
5 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 35,383 .8 (vs. 2)
.8 (vs. 3)
.5 (vs. 4)
6 Literality  familiarity 35,381 .8 (vs. 5)
7 Literality  explicitness 35,391 .001 (vs. 5)
8 Familiarity  explicitness 35,384 .1 (vs. 5)
9 Familiarity 35,382 .1 (vs. 6)
.8 (vs. 8)
10 Intercept 35,390 .001 (vs. 9)
tt—precritical
1 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 36,874
2 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 36,871 .3 (vs. 1)
3 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 36,872 .2 (vs. 1)
4 Familiarity  explicitness  literality 36,872 .2 (vs. 1)
5 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 36,870 .3 (vs. 2)
.8 (vs. 3)
.8 (vs. 4)
6 Literality  familiarity 36,868 .5 (vs. 5)
7 Literality  explicitness 36,876 .004 (vs. 5)
8 Familiarity  explicitness 36,882 	.001 (vs. 5)
9 Literality 36,875 .004 (vs. 6)
10 Familiarity 36,883 	.001 (vs. 6)
fp—critical
1 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 30,269
2 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 30,265 .5 (vs. 1)
3 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 30,266 .4 (vs. 1)
4 Familiarity  explicitness  literality 30,264 .6 (vs. 1)
5 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 30,264 .4 (vs. 2)
.8 (vs. 3)
.2 (vs. 4)
6 Literality  familiarity 30,262 .5 (vs. 5)
7 Literality  explicitness 30391 	.001 (vs. 5)
8 Familiarity  explicitness 30,266 .039 (vs. 5)
9 literality 30,331 	.001 (vs. 6)
10 Familiarity 30,264 .039 (vs. 6)
rp—critical
1 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 35,502
2 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 35,498 .4 (vs. 1)
3 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 35,503 .064 (vs. 1)
4 Familiarity  explicitness  literality 35,501 .1 (vs. 1)
5 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 35,501 .03 (vs. 2)
.8 (vs. 3)
.2 (vs. 4)
6 Literality  familiarity 35,496 .9 (vs. 2)
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Table G2 (continued)
Model number Fixed-effects structure AIC p (vs. model no.)
tt—critical
1 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 33,709
2 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 33,703 .9 (vs. 1)
3 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 33,707 .2 (vs. 1)
4 Familiarity  explicitness  literality 33,707 .3 (vs. 1)
5 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 33,705 .047 (vs. 2)
.9 (vs. 3)
.5 (vs. 4)
6 Literality  familiarity 33,701 .9 (vs. 2)
fp—postcritical
1 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 39,226
2 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 39,222 .7 (vs. 1)
3 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 39,221 .8 (vs. 1)
4 Familiarity  explicitness  literality 39,222 .7 (vs. 1)
5 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 39,220 .7 (vs. 2)
.5 (vs. 3)
.8 (vs. 4)
6 Literality  familiarity 39,218 .8 (vs. 5)
7 Literality  explicitness 39,219 .3 (vs. 5)
8 Familiarity  explicitness 39,242 	.001 (vs. 5)
9 Literality 39,217 .3 (vs. 6)
.8 (vs. 7)
10 Intercept 39,240 	.001 (vs. 9)
rp—postcritical
1 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 43676
2 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 43,671 .8 (vs. 1)
3 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 43,671 .7 (vs. 1)
4 Familiarity  explicitness  literality 43,672 .6 (vs. 1)
5 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 43,670 .4 (vs. 2)
.4 (vs. 3)
.7 (vs. 4)
6 Literality  familiarity 43,668 .9 (vs. 5)
7 Literality  explicitness 43,675 .008 (vs. 5)
8 Familiarity  explicitness 43,682 	.001 (vs. 5)
9 Literality 43,673 .008 (vs. 6)
10 Familiarity 43,680 	.001 (vs. 6)
tt—postcritical
1 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 41,604
2 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 41,599 .7 (vs. 1)
3 Literality  explicitness  familiarity 41,599 .6 (vs. 1)
4 Familiarity  explicitness  literality 41,599 .7 (vs. 1)
5 Literality  familiarity  explicitness 41,597 .6 (vs. 2)
.8 (vs. 3)
.7 (vs. 4)
6 Literality  familiarity 41,598 .1 (vs. 5)
7 Literality  explicitness 41,604 .002 (vs. 5)
8 Familiarity  explicitness 41,609 	.001 (vs. 5)
9 Literality 41,605 .002 (vs. 6)
10 Familiarity 41,610 	.001 (vs. 6)
Note. In this table, the fixed-effects structure gets progressively simpler at every step; a p value 	 .05 suggests that the
better model fit is the one with the more complex fixed-effects structure out of the two models being compared; similarly,
a p value 
 .05 suggests that it is the simpler fixed-effects structure that best describes the data. The fixed-effects structure
of the best model fit is in boldface. AIC  Akaike’s information criterion (the smaller the AIC, the better the model fit;
Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004).
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